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I. INTRODUCTION
This Note discusses the circumstances under which prosecutorial misconduct
warrants the dismissal of a grand jury indictment. In United States v. Sears, Roebuck
and Co., 1 the Ninth Circuit denied Sears' motion to dismiss an indictment even
though the court found that the prosecutor had abused the grand jury process. The
court stated that dismissal is justified only when a prosecutor's misconduct un-
dermines the grand jury's ability to make an informed and objective decision.2
Several other circuit courts hold this same view and assert that an indictment may be
dismissed only when the prosecutor's misconduct infringes on the defendant's con-
stitutional right to an impartial grand jury. Other circuit courts hold that a court may
use its supervisory powers3 to dismiss an indictment in response to a prosecutor's
misconduct even absent a showing of a biased grand jury. Those circuits which
accept this latter theory contend that a court does not need constitutional authority to
dismiss an indictment when dismissal is required to sustain the judicial integrity of
the court and the grand jury process.
The goals of the grand jury and the nature of the prosecutor's role in the grand
jury process support the contention that a court must have authority to exercise its
supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment. A grand jury should control abuses by
the government and protect the interests of the accused. A prosecutor should remain
impartial during grand jury proceedings to insure that a just result is attained. The use
of supervisory powers provides a remedy for the violation of an accused's recognized
rights, deters future misconduct, and preserves and enhances the integrity of the
judicial and the grand jury processes. Furthermore, a court's use of supervisory
powers will not frustrate any public interests if an effective standard is adopted to
govern the invocation of supervisory powers and if these powers are invoked sparing-
ly. This Note advocates the use of supervisory powers to dismiss indictments in
appropriate cases and prescribes an applicable standard under which these powers
may be exercised.
II. THE HISTORY AND NATURE OF THE GRAND JURY
The grand jury was established in England in 1166 during the reign of Henry II.'
The purpose of the grand jury was to consolidate the royal power by enabling the
1. 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984).
2. Id. at 1391. See also infra text accompanying notes 37-56.
3. Supervisory powers are a court's powers to supervise the administration of justice by establishing and maintain-
ing standards of procedure and evidence. See McNabb v. United States 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943).
4. M. FRANxEL & G. NAFrAuS, THE GRAND JURY: AN INsTrtuTION ON TRIAL 6 (1975); D. NISSMAN & E. HAGEN,
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION 14 (1982); T. PtcKNE'rr, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 112 (5th ed. 1956).
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centralized government to have additional control over the administration of justice
throughout the kingdom. Enhanced governmental control functioned to lessen the
power of the Church and the feudal barons. The grand jury was not intended to
protect citizens from arbitrary prosecution; instead, the grand jury was intended to be
subservient to the King, to enforce his dealings with the state, 5 and to encourage
citizens to provide the government with information pertaining to crimes. 6
In 1681, King Charles II sought to convict the Earl of Shaftesbury and Stephen
Colledge for treason. Both men were determined Protestant opponents of the King's
attempt to reestablish the Catholic Church in England. The grand jury rebuffed the
King's efforts to influence the proceedings and eventually refused to issue an indict-
ment. This assertion of power by the grand jury has been hailed as the initial man-
ifestation of its "role as a shield for the innocent against malicious and oppressive
prosecution." 7 English settlers brought the grand jury concept to the New World and
established the grand jury as an institution to (1) present malefactors for criminal
prosecution and (2) protect citizens from arbitrary prosecution. 8 The framers of the
United States Constitution later incorporated the right to a grand jury in the fifth
amendment 9 for essentially the same reasons:10 "The Grand Jury is both a sword and
shield of Justice-a sword because it is the terror of criminals, a shield because it is
the protection of the innocent against unjust prosecution." 1 1
The grand jury process has an important role in the federal criminal justice
system because a party cannot be charged with a felony unless a grand jury issues an
indictment.' 2 A grand jury proceeding is nonadversarial. The jurors do not determine
a defendant's guilt or innocence; they merely determine whether a crime has occurred
and whether an individual should be tried for that crime. The grand jury is an
independent investigatory body that has been characterized by the United States
Supreme Court as
a grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose
inquiries is not to be limited narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the
probable result of the investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual will be
found properly subject to an accusation of crime. t3
5. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrAUS, supra note 4, at 7.
6. T. PLucKmr, supra note 4, at 112. Today, a determination of probable cause is based upon information
presented by a prosecutor to the grand jury in a grand jury room. A grand jury acting on personal knowledge as a primary
source of evidence would be an exceptional case. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALis, supra note 4, at 6.
7. M. FRANK EL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 4, at 9.
8. L. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY 13 (1975).
9. The fifth amendment provides in part: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... U.S. CONsT. amend. V. During the American
Revolution, the grand jury prevented the British from prosecuting many colonists who were opposed to British authority.
The grand jury, therefore, became a highly respected institution. L. CLARK, supra note 8, at 16-17.
10. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1973).
11. A.B.A., FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959); see also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962).
12. The grand jury exists in the federal criminal system and in more than one-half of the state criminal justice
systems. The exact structure and format of the grand jury, however, varies from state to state. M. FRANKm. & G.
NAFrALis, supra note 4, at 19. The Supreme Court held in 1884 that the fifth amendment right to a grand jury does not
apply to the states. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). By 1884, however, some states already had elected not to
require a grand jury in their criminal systems. See e.g., State v. Keyes, 8 Vt. 57 (1836).
13. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
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The Supreme Court has asserted that the grand jury must be given broad investigatory
power if it is to be an effective instrument of law enforcement. 14 The Court has also
noted that it is appropriate to vest broad investigatory power in the grand jury; the
goals of a grand jury proceeding differ from the goals of a trial, and a defendant
receives full procedural protection at a trial. 15 Accordingly, many of the procedural
and constitutional restraints embodied in a trial are not present in a grand jury
proceeding. 16
The grand jury has several objectives. It must strive to ensure individual liber-
ties. In theory, the grand jury guards against malicious prosecution and protects
defendants from the expense and humiliation of an unwarranted trial.' 7 At the same
time, the grand jury is expected to prohibit the government from pursuing expensive
and wasteful litigation.' 8 The grand jury must also permit citizens to participate in the
maintenance of the law.'
9
III. THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR IN GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS
The Supreme Court has expressly defined the role of a prosecutor: A prosecutor
is a "representative... of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done." 20 A
prosecutor is to prosecute, to the fullest extent possible and within the bounds pro-
vided by law, those who have committed crimes. 21 Furthermore, a prosecutor is to
aid, not direct, a grand jury in determining if there is probable cause for a trial. 22
Undoubtedly, a prosecutor will make a personal determination about the guilt or
innocence of a defendant; nevertheless, the rights of the defendant must be pro-
tected.23
The prosecutor plays a major role in grand jury proceedings. The prosecutor
requests that a grand jury be convened, obtains evidence, secures witnesses, conducts
examinations, and instructs the grand jury on points of law.24 The grand jury's
productivity depends upon a prosecutor. Moreover, a prosecutor can greatly in-
fluence the grand jury because he or she controls the proceedings and the flow of
information. This unbounded influence has led critics to characterize the grand jury
14. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 700, 701-02 (1972).
15. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1973).
16. Id. at 343; see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 364 (1956) (The Court held that the validity of a grand
jury indictment is not affected by inadequate or incompetent evidence.); see also infra text accompanying notes 71-75.
17. Note, The Prosecutor's Unnecessary Use of Hearsay Evidence Before the Grand Jury, 61 WAsH. U.L.Q. 191,
197 (1983).
18. Id..
19. A.B.A., FEDERAL GRAND Jt HI-IANDBOOK 10 (1959).
20. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). One commentator argues that many prosecutors are insensitive
to their duty to seek justice and have developed a "conviction psychology, viewing conviction not as the preferred result
but as the only result." Lawless & North, Prosecutorial Misconduct, TRtAL, Oct. 1984, at 26, 27.
21. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
22. D. NtssmtAN & E. HAGEN, supra note 4, at 2.
23. Id.
24. Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue Influence, 39 U. Cttt. L. RIEv.
761, 766-67 (1972).
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as a "rubber stamp" of the prosecutor. 25 These critics fear that jurors passively
accept whatever a prosecutor presents. The jurors are inexperienced in legal matters
and therefore are inclined to rely improperly on the prosecutor.2 6 Furthermore, many
jurors believe that a defendant must be guilty because the prosecutor is attempting to
obtain an indictment.27
Proponents of the grand jury system emphasize that because a grand jury may
request further evidence, call for the production of certain witnesses, question the
witnesses directly, and request legal advice from a judge, the grand jury can curtail
the power of the prosecutor. 28 Proponents also assert that because a prosecutor is
barred from the room in which the jury deliberates, the jury is independent during the
crucial phase of the hearings. 29 Critics of the system argue, however, that grand
juries rarely consult outside counsel and rarely try to obtain additional evidence. In
addition, the judge's restricted role in a grand jury proceeding limits a judge's ability
to protect jurors from an overzealous prosecutor. 30 Moreover, defense attorneys are
not in a position to check the power of prosecutors, since most jurisdictions exclude
defense attorneys from grand jury proceedings. 3 1
The jurors, however, can rely on evidence presented by a prosecutor and make
an informed and objective decision if the prosecutor remains impartial. Theoretically,
the impartial role of a prosecutor effects a just result. Impartiality, however, is not
assured; when a prosecutor elects to present a case before the grand jury, the prosecu-
tor probably will be committed to securing an indictment. 32 Prosecutors are aware of
the expense and time that a trial demands. They also realize that a grand jury
indictment is of little value if the government's case cannot be proved in court. 33
Most prosecutors, therefore, will not seek an indictment unless they believe that a
defendant is guilty and that the government has sufficient admissible evidence to
obtain a conviction. 3
4
25. See D. NiSsMAN & E. HAGEN, supra note 4, at 2. Several commentators have suggested that the role of the
prosecutor in grand jury proceedings should be more restricted. In Florida, a special counsel, rather than a prosecutor,
instructs the grand jury. In North Carolina and Connecticut, a prosecutor does not attend the grand jury proceedings at any
stage. Arguably, even though a prosecutor may be absent from the proceedings, he or she still may influence the process
by continuing to control the flow of information that is presented to the grand jury. However, many commentators argue
that for the grand jury to be effective, a prosecutor must be present to protect the state's interest and to properly advise the
jury. J. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 144-45 (1980). Other commentators recommend
that a prosecutor's control over grand jury proceedings can be minimized by permitting the defense counsel to attend the
grand jury proceedings. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, supra note 4, at 64.
26. Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153, 154-55 (1965); see also L.
CLARK, supra note 8, at 141.
a 27. Antell, supra, note 26, at 155.
28. Comment, supra note 24, at 767.
29. The jurors also are instructed to be independent: "Listen to the evidence and the opinions of your fellow-jurors,
but don't be a rubber stamp." A.B.A., FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 18 (1959).
30. Comment, supra note 24, at 767. For a discussion of a judge's role in grand jury proceedings, see id. at 767-69.
31. M. FRANKE. & G. NAFrALIS, supra note 4, at 24.
32. The decision to pursue a particular indictment is likely to be reached after the prosecutor has considered a
significant number of factors, including the efficiency of the judicial system, the legal sufficiency of the govemment's
case, the cost of trial, the jurisdictional climate, the office procedure, and the political climate. For a discussion of the
decision-making process in a prosecutor's office, see G. COLE, POLrcs AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 143-49
(1973), and NATIONAL INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POLICY AND PROSECUTION (1982).
33. Prosecutors are concerned about their conviction rate; however, obtaining an indictment with insufficient
evidence will not improve a rate of conviction. M. FrNKEL & G. NAFTALIS, supra note 4, at 25.
34. See Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction
without Adjudication, 78 MICH. L. REv. 463, 503 n.206 (1980); see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351
(1973).
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Despite these practical considerations, however, the charging decision may be
tainted by prosecutorial misconduct. A prosecutor's decision to seek an indictment
might be motivated by political aspirations or by a desire to harass a defendant rather
than by an obligation to convict a wrongdoer. Furthermore, prosecutors may pursue
an indictment when there is insufficient evidence of legal guilt in order to "induce
defendants to incriminate themselves or others in return for a plea-bargain." 35
Although the reasons for prosecuting in these circumstances are improper, the com-
mitment to obtain an indictment is undoubtedly just as strong as the commitment to
obtain an indictment in other properly motivated cases.
Thus, the essential issue is raised: What steps are necessary to ensure that a
prosecutor's presentation of evidence to the grand jury is free of the prosecutor's
personal biases so that an informed and objective grand jury decision can be ob-
tained? Procedural rules have been established to ensure the impartiality of a grand
jury. 36 Adherence to those rules is the best assurance of impartiality. The existence
and use of a court's supervisory powers will provide prosecutors with the incentive to
abide by the procedural rules.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND THE
USE OF SUPERVISORY POWERS
The due process clause of the United States Constitution requires that an accused
be indicted by an impartial grand jury. 37 Accordingly, if a court concludes that a
prosecutor has engaged in misconduct, it must determine whether the misconduct
35. Arenella, supra note 34, at 502; see also M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrAIIS, supra note 4, at 52-53.
36. Prosecutorial misconduct may include (1) Prejudicial statements made by the prosecutor, such as abusive
language, improper accusations, and inflammatory remarks; see United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979); (2)
Preindictment publicity that is substantially generated by the prosecutor; see Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541 (1962);
United States av. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 1061-65 (D. Md. 1976); (3) Failure to present exculpatory evidence; see
United States v. Gold. 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. Ill. 1979); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSBILrry DR 7-103(B)
(1982). But see United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508,
512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) (The prosecutor has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand
jury.); (4) The use of hearsay evidence by the prosecutor in grand jury proceedings although reliance on hearsay evidence
alone is not a vald cause for dismissal of a grand jury indictment; see Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956);
United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (Sth Cir. 1973); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972); (5) Use of the
grand jury for political gain; see Bergman v. Lefkowitz, No. 77-3344 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aftrd 569 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.
1977); see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBtLrrY DR 9-101 (1982); (6) Use of the grand jury for the
purpose of obtaining evidence for another trial; see United States v. Doss, 545 F.2d 548, 552 (6th Cir. 1976); Beverly v.
United States, 468 F.2d 732, 743 (5th Cir. 1972); (7) Use of a grand jury to prepare a civil case; see Ingram v. United
States, 541 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 929 (1977); United States v. Procter,& Gamble Co., 187 F.
Supp. 55 (D.N.J. 1960); (8) Delaying the presentment of an indictment; see United States v. Marian, 404 U.S. 307
(1971); United States v. Mays, 549 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1977); (9) Premature signing of an indictment; see United States v.
Singer, 660 F.2d 1295, 1302 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1156 (1982); (10) Improper use of subpeona power
see United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984);
(11) Conflict of interest by the government attorney (the prosecutor must be a disinterested party); see United States v.
Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. I11. 1979); (12) The prosecutor acting as a witness; see United States v. Birdman, 602
F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336 (N.D. I11. 1979);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RFsPONSmtLrry DR 5-101(B) (1982); (13) Violation of the grand jury secrecy rules; see
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e).
Whether these forms of prosecutorial misconduct warrant the dismissal of an indictment depends on the facts and the
circumstances of each case. See Jeffress, Dismissal of Indictments for Abuse of the Grand Jury Process, 4 A.L.I. A.B.A
COURSE MAT. J. 57 (April 1980).
The actions of a trial judge may also lead to the dismissal of an indictment. See Blake v. State, 54 Okla. Crim. 62, 14
P.2d 240 (1932).
37. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960); see also United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347,
1353 (9th Cir. 1981).
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undermined the grand jury's ability to make an informed and objective decision. 38 If
the defendant demonstrates that he or she was prejudiced, then the indictment must be
dismissed in order to protect the defendant's constitutional rights.39 If the defendant
fails to prove prejudice, then the Constitution does not require that the indictment be
dismissed. Circuit courts, however, disagree on whether, in the absence of a biased
grand jury, supervisory powers may be used to dismiss an indictment because of
prosecutorial misconduct.4 °
Recently, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Sears, Roebuck and Co.,
4 1
discussed the differing views on the use of supervisory powers. In Sears the de-
fendant Sears was accused of overstating the price it paid for television receivers
purchased from Japanese manufacturers. Sears allegedly falsified the cost figures so
that the recorded prices would meet the minimum price standard established by the
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Sears allegedly engaged in
this practice to avoid dumping duties that are imposed in the United States for selling
imported goods at less than fair market value."' The grand jury issued an indictment.
Sears alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the treatment of witnesses and the presenta-
tion of evidence and moved to dismiss the indictment. The district court found that
the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct for the following five reasons: (1) the
prosecutor failed to control the testimony of a particular witness, permitting the
witness to make inflamatory and prejudicial statements; (2) the prosecutor expressed
his personal views about the evidence; (3) the prosecutor abused the Sears' em-
ployees who had been called as witnesses; (4) the prosecutor failed to present ex-
culpatory evidence necessary to allow the jury to make an informed decision; and (5)
the prosecutor improperly issued subpoenas. 43
The district court held that the pervasiveness of the prosecutor's misconduct
precluded the grand jury from making an impartial determination of probable cause.
Therefore, the court dismissed the indictment. 44 The court emphasized that a pros-
ecutor assumes a dominant role in grand jury proceedings, especially since defense
attorneys are' absent from grand jury hearings. Because a prosecutor possesses un-
bridled power, the court concluded that overzealous prosecution of a case should not
be tolerated and asserted that for such extreme misconduct, the only remedy is to
dismiss the indictment."5
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the prosecutor had acted improperly. The court
stated, "it is undeniable that the prosecutor abused his prerogatives in conducting this
grand jury investigation-and we stress again that we are dismayed by the tactics he
38. In extreme cases of prosecutorial misconduct, a grand jury might be dismissed prior to handing down an
indictment. See United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 292 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
39. U.S. v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v.
Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 200 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 95-136.
41. 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984).
42. Id. at 1388.
43. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 518 F. Supp. 179, 185-89 (C.D. Cal. 1981). rev'd 719 F.2d 1386 (9th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984).
44. Id. at 190.
45. Id. at 188-90.
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employed. "46 Although the court found that the prosecutor had abused the the grand
jury process, it held that the indictment should not be dismissed; the misconduct had
not infringed on the defendant's constitutional right to be indicted only after an
independent determination of probable cause made by a legally constituted grand
jury. The court stated that dismissal is warranted "on constitutional grounds if prose-
cutorial misconduct has undermined the grand jury's ability to make an informed and
objective evaluation of the evidence presented to it."4 7 A court must focus only on
"the impact of [the prosecutor's] misconduct on the grand jury's impartiality" and
"not on the degree of culpability of the prosecutor." ' 48 The court also held that the
defendant must bear the burden of proof that the jury was unduly biased. Sears failed
to demonstrate bias. 49 The court reasoned that even though the prosecutor's mis-
conduct prejudiced the jury, other actions of the prosecutor neutralized that effect and
reinforced the independence and objectivity of the grand jury. The court also noted
that the misconduct was comparatively insignificant in light of the length of the
hearings and the tremendous amount of material that was presented to the jurors. 50
The Ninth Circuit refused to acknowledge that the use of supervisory powers
could be the basis for dismissing an indictment. In its view, a court should rarely
intervene because the constitutional separation of powers doctrine mandates that a
court respect the independence of the grand jury system. 5 The court argued further
that since a grand jury proceeding is preliminary, and since a defendant is afforded
constitutional protections at trial, there is less need to extend evidentiary and pro-
cedural restrictions to grand jury hearings. 52 The Sears court concluded that only
when the grand jury has not acted impartially should an indictment be dismissed,
since it is only in this instance that the defendant's constitutional rights are violated.53
One circuit judge dissented in part, stating: "I would, unlike the majority,
...leave open . . . the question whether the district court may exercise its discre-
tion to dismiss the indictment on supervisory power grounds." 54 The dissenting
46. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1392 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441
(1984).
47. Id. at 1391.
48. Id. at 1392.
49. Id.
50. See id. at 1392-94 for the court's discussion of the appellant's insufficiency of proof that the jury was biased by
the prosecutor's misconduct,
51. Id. at 1391 n.7; see also United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied. 434 U.S. 825
(1977).
52. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1391 n.7 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441
(1984).
53. Id. at 1394. Whether the Ninth Circuit has denied lower courts the right to use supervisory powers to dismiss an
indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct in all situations is unclear. In United States v. Samango, 607 F.2d 877
(9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit upheld the use of supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment for drug trafficking. In
Samango the prosecutor committed several misdeeds including the deliberate introduction of pejured testimony to the
grand jury. Id. at 881. The court stated "that the manner in which the prosecution obtained the indictment represented a
serious threat to the integrity of the judicial process. The District Court's dismissal, therefore, was a proper exercise of its
supervisory power." Id. at 885. However, the court also indicated that the prosecutor's errors "operated to the de-
fendant's prejudice by producing a biased grand jury." Id. at 884. This decision, therefore, may not be inconsistent with
the holding in Sears.
54. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984).
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judge asserted that dismissal based on constitutional grounds is analytically distinct
from dismissal based on a court's supervisory power. The use of supervisory powers
supports two institutional goals: deterring future prosecutorial misconduct and main-
taining the integrity of the judicial process.5 5 These goals are separate from the goal
of protecting a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The dissent concluded
that the public has a primary interest in the sustenance of the judicial system's values.
The benefit a defendant may receive from the dismissal of an indictment is incidental
to this more significant public concern. 56 A court, therefore, should have the right, in
the appropriate circumstances, to invoke its supervisory powers to dismiss an indict-
ment when dismissal is necessary to maintain judicial integrity or to deter future
prosecutorial misconduct.
V. THE VIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court has not directly considered the circumstances under which
an indictment may be dismissed because of prosecutorial misconduct. Decisions in
which the Court has addressed the propriety of indictment dismissal in general do not
provide a clear indication of the present Court's view of the circumstances that justify
dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct.
In McNabb v. United States57 the Supreme Court asserted that a court's inherent
role of supervising the judicial system "implies the duty of establishing and maintain-
ing civilized standards of procedure and evidence." 5 8 The Court continually has
recognized the necessity and the right of a court to use supervisory powers in certain
instances. On several occasions, the exercise of supervisory powers has been
approved in order to suppress evidence that the government obtained by improper
actions. 59 The Court has expressed the belief that the use of supervisory powers in
these instances would deter misconduct and protect the integrity of the judicial proc-
ess.
60
Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government officials shall be sub-
jected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a government of
laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails to observe the law scrupu-
lously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government be-
comes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto
himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the
55. Id.; see also United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 736 n.8 (1980).
56. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984).
57. 318 U.S. 332, (1943).
58. Id. at 340.
59. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957);
Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 32 (1943). The federal supervisory
rule espoused by McNabb and Mallory, which provided for power to suppress confessions obtained in violation of FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5(a), has been superseded by 18 U.S.C. x3051 (1982), see United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908,912-13 (9th
Cir. 1983).
60. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Mesarosh v. United States 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
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end justifies the means-to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to
secure the conviction of a private criminal-would bring terrible retribution. Against that
pernacious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
61
Although none of the cases in which the Court approved the use of supervisory
powers concerned either prosecutorial misconduct or an appeal to dismiss an indict-
ment, the policy considerations in those cases are still relevant. The policy concerns
form a foundation upon which a court may exercise its supervisory powers to dismiss
an indictment for prosecutorial misconduct.
A. Indictment Validity
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to sustain challenges to the validity of
grand jury indictments. In Costello v. United States62 the Supreme Court stated that
"[a]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . .if
valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The Fifth
Amendment requires nothing more." 63 The Costello Court held that an indictment is
not invalidated by the grand jury's consideration of hearsay. 64 Justice Black, writing
for the majority of the Court, justified the holding on three grounds. First, consistent
with the broad investigatory powers of the grand jury, the panel should not be bound
by evidentiary rules. Second, the judicial system would suffer burdensome delays if
courts were forced to consider challenges which alleged that indictments were based
on incompetent evidence. Finally, evidentiary challenges would "add nothing to the
assurance of a fair trial."-
65
In United States v. Morrison66 the Court refused to dismiss an indictment when
the government interfered with the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel.67
The defendant was indicted on federal drug charges and had been questioned, in the
absence of her counsel, on two occasions by federal agents.68 The Court held that
because the defendant experienced no adverse consequences as a result of the gov-
ernment's actions, the indictment could not be dismissed. 69 The Court based its
decision on the strong public interest in prosecuting crimes. 70 This public interest is
outweighed, and an indictment's dismissal is warranted, only when the constitutional
infringement of a defendant's right to counsel has a prejudicial effect.
In United States v. Calandra7 1 the Supreme Court denied a fourth amendment
61. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting, overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
62. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
63. Id. at 363 (footnote omitted).
64. Id. at 359.
65. Id. at 362-64.
66. 449 U.S. 361 (1981).
67. See U.S. CONST., amend. VI.
68. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 362 (1981).
69. Id. at 367.
70. Id. at 364. The Court also stated that absent demonstratable prejudice, an indictment cannot be dismissed, even
though the misconduct was deliberate. Id. at 365.
71. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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challenge to the validity of an indictment. The Court held that evidence may be used
in grand jury proceedings even if it was acquired in violation of the exclusionary
rule.72 A witness who had appeared before the grand jury had refused to answer
questions that were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search and sei-
zure.7 3 The Court ruled that the use of the evidence was appropriate because the
investigative role of the grand jury traditionally had been unimpeded by evidentiary
restrictions.7 4 The Court also stressed that grand jury proceedings do not require
typical trial restraints since a defendant will have full constitutional protections at
trial. 7
5
Costello, Morrison, and Calandra may indicate that the Supreme Court believes
misconduct by a government official should not warrant the dismissal of an indict-
ment, unless the misconduct has undermined the ability of a grand jury to make an
objective decision. The policy justifications, however, for dismissing an indictment
because of prosecutorial misconduct-to deter improper conduct and to protect the
integrity of the courts-were not applicable in those cases. The Court in Morrison
suggested that "a Sixth Amendment violation may . . . be remedied in other pro-
ceedings. "76 The Morrison Court may have reasoned that the existence of alternative
remedies for violations deters misconduct and protects judicial integrity. The Court
ruled in Costello that the presentation of hearsay evidence to a grand jury does not
constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Absent prosecutorial misconduct, the Court did
not have to focus on whether dismissal of the indictment was required to maintain the
integrity of the judicial system, or whether dismissal of the indictment was required
to deter future misconduct. Additionally, in Calandra, the Court asserted that the
exclusionary rule's application to grand jury proceedings would not have a deterrent
effect on improper police investigations. 77 Moreover, the improperly obtained evi-
dence in Calandra and the hearsay evidence in Costello are types of information a
grand jury normally should consider. 78 A grand jury "may consider incompetent
evidence" because its investigatory function requires extensive investigation un-
impeded by evidentiary restrictions.7 9 Prosecutorial misconduct, however, has no
value at all because it does not assist a grand jury in ascertaining the truth; in fact,
prosecutorial misconduct is counterproductive since it often distorts the truth.
72. The exclusionary rule is derived from the fourth amendment of the Constitution.
73. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 339 (1974).
74. Id. at 349.
75. Id. at 343.
76. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 367 (1981).
77. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 351 (1974). The dissent, however, argued that applying the ex-
clusionary rule to grand jury proceedings would have a deterrent effect on improper police investigations. Id. at 355-56
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 344. In discussing Costello and Calandra, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Zielezinski, 740 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1984), asserted:
These cases suggest that challenges to indictments will not be heard where they rest on objection to the
evidence-gathering process. They leave open the possibility, however, of hearing challenges to indictments
where improprieties occurred within the grand jury process itself.
Id. at 732.
79. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
[Volume 45:10771086
19841 INDICTMENTS AND PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
B. Conviction Validity in Cases of Prosecutorial Misconduct
Recently, in United States v. Hasting,80 the Supreme Court had an opportunity
to address the circumstances under which a conviction may be overturned because of
prosecutorial misconduct. In Hasting the defendants were convicted of kidnapping
and transporting women across state lines for immoral purposes. The defendants
appealed their convictions and alleged prosecutorial misconduct. The Seventh Circuit
used its supervisory powers to reverse the convictions in order to discipline the
prosecutor for improper conduct.8 ' The prosecutor violated the defendants' fifth
amendment right to freedom from self-incrimination because during the trial, the
prosecutor commented on the defendants' evidence and indicated that the defendants
had never challenged the charges levied against them. 82 The Seventh Circuit's deci-
sion was not based on jury bias. Instead, the Seventh Circuit reversed the conviction
in an effort to punish the prosecutor for his improper behavior.
The Supreme Court, relying on the harmless error doctrine, 83 reversed the
Seventh Circuit's decision.84 The Court stated that a conviction does not have to be
reversed if the prosecutorial misconduct was harmless, even if that misconduct in-
volved an infringement of the defendants' constitutional rights. 85 The Court reasoned
that participants in a trial are fallible and undoubtedly will commit errors. Therefore,
convictions should not be dismissed readily. Furthermore, since several safeguards
ensured a fair trial, the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated. The
Court, in addition, expressed the need to reinforce the public's interest in prosecuting
crimes. 8
6
Hasting, however, holds only that a conviction resulting from prosecutorial
misconduct will not be dismissed per se. Hasting does not establish an absolute rule
against the exercise of supervisory powers in circumstances involving a harmless
error.87 The dissent explicitly stated that a court should not be precluded from using
its supervisory powers simply because a prosecutor's error is harmless.8 8 Further-
more, the reason the Court refused to allow the lower court to invoke its supervisory
powers is apparent from the facts of Hasting. First, the jury's finding that the de-
fendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt was supported by overwhelming
evidence. 89 Second, the prosecutor's conduct was not clearly improper.90 Third,
80. 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983).
81. United States v. Hastings, 660 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1981), rel"d, 461 U.S. 499 (1983).
82. Id. at 303.
83. The harmless error doctrine mandates that if in a particular case a defendant's constitutional rights have been
violated, the convictions will not be dismissed per se when the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States
v. Hastings, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1980 (1983).
84. Id. at 1982.
85. Id. at 1980.
86. Id. at 1981.
87. Id. at 1988 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
88. Id. Justice Brennan states that "[c]onvictions are important, but they should not be protected at any cost." Id. at
1990.
89. Id. at 512.
90. Id. at 506 n.4; see also id. at 512-13 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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because of the Hasting crimes' sensitive nature, the Court was concerned that the
victims would experience severe trauma if forced to endure a new trial. 9' Finally,
because over four years had passed since the defendants had been charged with the
crimes, many practical problems may have arisen if the case were retried.9 2 There-
fore, in Hasting the interests that would have been served by allowing the court to
invoke its supervisory powers were outweighed by the compelling facts of the case
and by practical considerations. As stated by the Hasting majority opinion,
"'[G]uided by considerations of justice,' and in the exercise of supervisory powers,
federal courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required
by the Constitution or the Congress." 9 3 Thus, the Supreme Court has not absolutely
prohibited the use of supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment.
94
VI. LOWER FEDERAL COURTS' VIEWS ON THE USE OF SUPERVISORY
POWERS TO DISMISS INDICTMENTS
Circuit courts diverge in their opinions on whether an indictment may be dis-
missed because of prosecutorial misconduct in the absence of an impartial grand jury.
Several courts have ruled in accordance with the holding in Sears.
In United States v. McKenzie95 a grand jury was asked to ascertain whether
alleged police conduct in the investigation of a fatal shooting of a police officer
violated federal law. The prosecutor in McKenzie expressed an opinion about the
credibility of a witness and instructed the grand jury that an indictment should be
issued. In fact, the prosecutor had signed the indictment form prior to the grand jury's
deliberations. 96 The district court dismissed the indictment issued by the grand jury
because of the prosecutor's misconduct. 97 The Fifth Circuit reinstated the indictment.
The court felt that the grand jury had not been improperly influenced by the pros-
ecutor's actions 98 and held that "an indictment may be dismissed only where the
defendants' case has been unfairly prejudiced." 99 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
argument that a court may invoke its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment and
stated that as long as a grand jury makes an independent determination, the integrity
of the grand jury is upheld.' 0 0
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Quiovers'01 that a loss of evidence, by itself, did not warrant the dismissal of an
indictment for the unlawful distribution of narcotics.' 0 2 In Quiovers the Drug
91. Id. at 1979.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1978 (quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 341 (1943)) (citation omitted).
94. See United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 762 n.2 (2d Cir. 1983) (United States v. Hastings does not preclude
the use of supervisory powers by a court to dismiss an indictment.).
95. 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
96. Id. at 632.
97. Id. at 631.
98. Id. at 634.
99. Id. at 631 (emphasis added).
100. Id.; see also United States v. Fulmer, 722 F.2d 1192 (5th Cir. 1983).
101. 539 F.2d 744 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
102. Id. at 746.
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Enforcement Agency failed to preserve a tape recording of a conversation between an
undercover agent and the defendant. The court held that prejudice against the de-
fendant must be demonstrated for dismissal of an indictment to be appropriate.'
0 3
Although Quiovers did not involve prosecutorial misconduct, it indicates the un-
willingness of the court to allow the use of supervisory powers to dismiss an indict-
ment in response to misconduct.
Other circuits have espoused the view that a court may use its supervisory
powers to dismiss an indictment even in the absence of grand jury prejudice. In
United States v. Serubo'0 4 the defendant was indicted for violations of internal
revenue laws. The prosecutor in Serubo badgered uncooperative witnesses, com-
mented on the veracity of witnesses, and attempted to link the defendant to organized
crime. 0 5 The district court held that an indictment could not be dismissed unless the
prosecutorial misconduct undermined the grand jury's ability to make an impartial
decision.10 6 While the prosecutor in Serubo was guilty of misconduct, the district
court refused to dismiss the indictment. In the court's view, the grand jury's ability to
make an impartial decision had not been affected.
The Third Circuit remanded Serubo and ruled that the district court had in-
correctly interpreted the law.'0 7 The Third Circuit asserted that a court has "the
authority . . . in the exercise of its supervisory power, to order the dismissal of the
indictment as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct before the grand jury," and that
"[p]rejudice to the individual defendant has never been required in order to justify the
exercise of the supervisory power."' The Third Circuit recognized that grand jury
proceedings are secret and largely under the control of the prosecutor, and that,
therefore, the grand jury system might be abused. The court concluded that the
judiciary needs supervisory powers to aid in the regulation of grand jury proceedings.
The court also stated that federal courts have an institutional interest that is in-
dependent of the defendant's rights-the need to maintain the appearance and the
reality of fair proceedings.' 0 9
In United States v. Hogan 10 the Second Circuit dismissed the defendants' grand
jury indictments for conspiracy to sell heroin. In Hogan the court felt that the pros-
ecutor was "too determined to obtain an indictment.""'. The prosecutor had pre-
sented hearsay evidence to the grand jury, engaged in inflamatory rhetoric, and made
speculative assertions about the defendant which proved to be false." 2 The court
concluded that "the incidents [were] flagrant and unconscionable. Taking advantage
of his special position of trust, the [prosecutor] impaired the grand jury's integrity as
103. Id.
104. 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 815,
106. United States v. Serubo, 460 F. Supp. 689 (E.D. Penn. 1978), vacated, 604 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1979).
107. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816 (3d Cir. 1979).
108. Id. at 816-17.
109. Id. at 817.
110. 712 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1983).
111. Id. at 757.
112. Id. at 761-62.
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an independent body."" 3 The court asserted "that dismissal of an indictment is
justified to achieve either of two objectives: to eliminate prejudice to a defendant; or,
pursuant to [a court's] supervisory power, to prevent prosecutorial impairment of the
grand jury's independent role .... [T]he latter function is implicated here." 114
In another Second Circuit decision, United States v. Thibadeau, ll5 the court
refused to dismiss an indictment which alleged that the defendant had aided and
abetted the submission of false loan documents.116 The defendant claimed that the
prosecutor had harassed witnesses and had required the defendant to exercise his fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court held that no prosecutorial
misconduct that would warrant the dismissal of an indictment had occurred: "[T]he
government did not harass a witness . . . [or] ask appellant questions that it had
reason to believe would cause him to invoke his fifth amendment privilege ...
[I]f there was prejudice at all to appellant, it was not sufficient to warrant the extreme
sanction of dismissing the indictment." ' "17 The court added, however, that "even
though a jury unanimously found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
• ..[or] even though the defendant admitted his guilt. . .[the court may] neverthe-
less void his conviction because the prosecutor had made a misstep in obtaining a
grand jury determination of probable cause."'' 8
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Pino, " 9 held that the prosecutor's use of a
suppressed statement to coerce testimony from a witness was improper. This mis-
conduct, however, did not warrant the dismissal of the indictment because the error
was harmless. ' 20 Other direct evidence provided a sufficient basis for the defendant's
involuntary manslaughter indictment. Although the circumstances in Pino did not
"justify exercise of the court's supervisory power to protect the integrity of the
judicial process," the Tenth Circuit endorsed the use of supervisory powers in appro-
priate cases, stating that an indictment may be dismissed because of a fifth amend-
ment violation or because of a court's exercise of supervisory powers.121
Some circuits have adopted restrictive standards governing when lower courts
may properly exercise supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment because of pros-
ecutorial misconduct. The Sixth Circuit, for instance, held in United States v.
Adamo122 that the use of perjured testimony to secure an indictment did not warrant
the dismissal of an indictment. The defendants, convicted on several counts of con-
spiracy to unlawfully distribute drugs, moved that the original indictment be set aside
on the ground that a ledger book that was submitted to the grand jury contained false
113. Id. at 762.
114. Id. at 761. The court also stated that the "grand jury was probably misled by [the prosecutor's] presentation."
Id. at 762.
115. 671 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. 1982).
116. Id. at 76.
117. Id. at 78.
118. Id. at 77-78.
119.708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983).
120. Id. at 531.
121. Id; cf. United States v. Nunez, 668 F.2d 1116, 1126 (10th Cir. 1982) (A defendant must affirmatively show
that the grand jury was biased by the prosecutorial misconduct before an indictment can be dismissed.).
122. 742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984).
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entries. The court, in refusing to overturn the indictment, emphasized that the pros-
ecutor did not knowingly use perjured testimony and that the prosecutor was not
obligated to return the case to the grand jury when there was no demonstratable proof
that the grand jury was improperly biased. 123 The court added, however, that:
[Ojur approach does not render our Courts powerless against a prosecutor who abuses the
office, for the power to exercise supervisory control over the prosecutor to protect the
integrity of the judicial system remains. This power includes the authority to dismiss an
indictment when appropriate. However, such supervisory power should be ex-
ercised ... sparingly, "and only on a showing of demonstrated and longstanding prose-
cutorial misconduct."'' 24
In United States v. Cady'" the defendant was convicted of mail fraud, but
moved that the conviction be set aside because erroneous and prejudicial information
was used to obtain the indictment. 126 The Eighth Circuit rejected the claim that the
indictment should be dismissed, stating that there was no proof that the grand jury
had been unable to make an objective decision as a result of the prosecutor's
misconduct.' 27 The court did acknowledge, however, that a prosecutor's willful
deception may justify the invocation of a court's supervisory powers to dismiss an
indictment. The Eighth Circuit concluded that "absent some evidence of gross
purposeful deception by the prosecutor, an indictment legally valid on its face will
not be overturned." 1
28
In United States v. Udziela 129 the defendant was indicted for conspiracy to
illegally manufacture and distribute the drug PCP. The defendant moved to dismiss
the indictment because it was based on perjured testimony presented by the prosecu-
tor. The Seventh Circuit held that when a prosecutor presents perjured testimony to a
grand jury, an indictment does not have to be dismissed if sufficient valid evidence to
support the indictment is presented.130 In Udziela, however, the court did not find
that the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct, because the government was unaware
of the perjured testimony at the time of the hearings. The court did suggest that
"outrageous or intentional prosecutorial misconduct" might warrant the dismissal of
an indictment. 131
123. Id. at 940-41.
124. Id. at 942 (quoting United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1982)).
125. 567 F.2d 771 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
126. Id. at 773.
127. Id. at 776.
128. Id. Later, in United States v. Singer, 660 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 1156 (1982), the
Eighth Circuit held that the submission of a presigned indictment to a grand jury did not warrant the dismissal of an
indictment for conspiracy to sell stolen goods. The court stated that even though the conduct clearly was improper, the
dismissal of the indictment would be warranted only if the grand jury was unduly influenced. Id. at 1302. In Singer, the
court did not address the possibility of invoking its supervisory powers to dismiss the indictment.
129. 671 F.2d 995 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 457 U.S. 1135 (1982).
130. Id. at 1001.
131. Id. The Seventh Circuit's current position on whether a court may use supervisory powers to dismiss an
indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct is unclear. In United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135 (1982), the defendants argued that pretrial publicity created by the prosecutor warranted the
dismissal of an indictment for mail fraud. The defendants claimed the misconduct violated their right to an impartial grand
jury and a fair trial. The Seventh Circuit refused to dismiss the indictment, holding that the defendants failed to
demonstrate the grand jury was biased by the publicity. Id. at 298. The court maintained that the dismissal of an
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The Eleventh Circuit has refrained from addressing the issue of when pros-
ecutorial misconduct warrants the dismissal of an indictment. In United States v.
Pabiant'32 the defendants moved to dismiss their indictments for mail fraud. They
alleged that the prosecutor violated re-presentment procedures 3 3 and improperly
prohibited one of the defendants from testifying.' 34 The Eleventh Circuit held that
prosecutorial misconduct had not occurred. The decision to resubmit a case to a grand
jury is a matter of prosecutorial discretion, and, therefore, the prosecutor had not
violated re-presentment procedures. Furthermore, the prosecutor's prohibition on the
defendant's testimony was proper since a defendant has no constitutional right to
appear before a grand jury. 135 The court acknowledged that it had not previously
addressed the issue of when an indictment may be dismissed. The court also noted
that other circuits were divided on the issue. The Eleventh Circuit, however, refused
to take advantage of the opportunity offered by Pabian and stated that since no
misconduct had occurred, the court would decide when prosecutorial misconduct
warrants the dismissal of an indictment on another day.' 
36
VII. THE NECESSITY OF SUPERVISORY POWERS
Supervisory powers should be granted to courts so that they may dismiss grand
jury indictments in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. The use of supervisory powers
will further four essential public interests. First, it will enhance the protection of
individual rights. Second, it will ensure the independence of the grand jury system.
Third, it will deter future prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, it will preserve the
integrity of the judicial system. To realize these interests courts must be free to
exercise supervisory powers in appropriate situations, especially since the cautious
use of these powers will not frustrate public policy.
Supervisory powers are necessary to protect a defendant's rights. Dominant
goals of the grand jury system are to shield a defendant from unwarranted criminal
charges and to guard against unfounded prosecutions. 137 Simply because a defendant
is afforded constitutional protections of due process at trial does not justify intrusions
on a defendant's rights during grand jury proceedings. An indictment can have
devastating personal and professional consequences for a defendant. A later opportu-
nity to contest and disprove the charges at trial often will not remedy the damage
caused by the indictment. 138 Thus, a court should be able to exercise its supervisory
indictment in the absence of grand jury prejudice serves only to punish society for the prosecutor's misdeed. Id. at 299.
There was no indication that the court would sanction the use of supervisory powers by the lower court to dismiss the
indictment.
132. 704 F.2d 1533 (1tth Cir. 1983).
133. See infra text accompanying note 170.
134. United States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1983).
135. Id. at 1537-39.
136. Id. at 1540. The Eleventh Circuit has since intimated that under appropriate circumstances a court may invoke
its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. See United States v. Hyder, 732
F.2d 841, 845 (11th Cir. 1984).
137. See supra text accompanying notes 4-19.
138. United States v. Sembo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979).
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powers to protect a defendant from suffering the effects of an improperly obtained
indictment.
Courts also should be afforded the opportunity to use supervisory powers to
dismiss indictments to ensure the independence of the grand jury system. It can be
very difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a grand jury was unduly biased. A jury
may have been biased in a particular case, but often the indictment will not be
dismissed because the defendant cannot offer sufficient proof to demonstrate bias. 3 9
Because the defense attorney is barred from the proceedings and because grand jury
proceedings are surrounded by secrecy, the defense attorney is often uninformed
about the substance of the hearings. 140 Moreover, no one knows exactly how grand
juries function and what actually influences their decisions. The testimony of jurors
cannot be determinative on the question of whether they were improperly influenced.
Few people will admit that they were biased. 14' Additionally, some jurors may not
realize that they were improperly influenced.
Several approaches have been suggested to solve the problem of proving grand
jury bias. These alternatives allow more liberal standards for dismissal. One approach
adopts a presumption that an indictment must be dismissed unless the prosecutor can
prove that the grand jury was not biased improperly by the misconduct that occurred
during the proceedings. 142 Proponents of this view explain that the beneficiary of an
error, the prosecutor who is guilty of misconduct, should be forced to establish that
the error did not contribute to the indictment. 143 Unfortunately, this solution is
inadequate; it merely shifts the problem-the difficulty of proving or disproving
bias-to the prosecutor. In addition, proving that the grand jury was not biased would
require much time and expense. The government's time and resources should not be
devoted to a trial in which the government must prove lack of jury bias-especially
since the difficulty of proof almost guarantees that the government will lose.'44 As a
result, grand jury indictments might be dismissed too frequently. A better approach
permits a court to consider using its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment
when a prejudicial effect of prosecutorial misconduct would be difficult to prove.
This approach would prevent continual interference with the grand jury process as
well as allow courts the flexibility to redress prosecutorial abuses.
Courts must be able to exercise their supervisory powers to ensure the grand
jury's independence from the prosecutor. The use of these powers will allow courts to
remedy egregious prosecutorial misconduct and to provide a check on the prosecu-
139. See Lawless & North, supra note 20, at 28.
140. For an outline of the steps that a defense attorney may take to prove that prosecutorial misconduct has biased a
grand jury, see Lawless & North, supra note 20, at 28.
141. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221-22 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring); United States v. Zielezinski,
740 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1984).
142. Most courts adopt a presumption of regularity of the proceedings. See, e.g., United States, v. Steel, 238 F.
Supp. 580, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Most courts also place the burden of proof of jury bias on the defendant, and thereby
require the defendant to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the grand jury was biased by the prosecutorial
misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct.
1441 (1984); United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1982).
143. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
144. Arguably, since prosecutors control grand jury proceedings, they should be able to satisfy the burden of proof
requirement if the grand jury in fact was not biased.
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tor's control over grand jury proceedings. A prosecutor wields tremendous control
over grand jury proceedings and commands considerable respect from the lay persons
on a grand jury.145 Therefore, a prosecutor who violates procedural rules has great
potential to improperly prejudice a grand jury. Not only must prosecutors be encour-
aged to strictly adhere to procedural rules to minimize jury bias, a court also must
exercise supervisory powers to check the improper influence of a prosecutor who has
violated the established procedural norms in order to ensure that the grand jury
remains independent of the prosecutor.
Considerations of public policy mandate the availability of supervisory powers
to dismiss indictments absent a showing that prosecutorial misconduct interfered with
the impartiality of the grand jury. Supervisory powers advance the goals of the grand
jury; the existence and the use of supervisory powers deters prosecutorial misconduct
and preserves judicial integrity. 146 A court should be free to dismiss an indictment in
order to deter flagrant misconduct by the offending prosecutor and in order to deter
future misconduct by other prosecutors. The use of supervisory powers warns prose-
cutors that courts will act if prosecutors behave improperly. This warning might
prevent future misconduct that otherwise would require the dismissal of indictments.
Thus, future trials to dismiss indictments could be avoided. The exercise of supervis-
ory powers, therefore, should save the public from bearing unnecessary expense and
delay.
Many courts are reluctant to concede that a grand jury has been biased by a
prosecutor's misconduct. 147 These courts believe that because a defendant receives
procedural protections at trial, the judiciary should not interfere with the broad
investigatory powers of a grand jury or encroach on its independence. The courts'
reluctance to interfere with grand jury proceedings has exacerbated the problems that
require the use of supervisory powers. 148 The unwillingness of courts to find bias
advances the likelihood that prosecutorial misconduct will occur since prosecutors are
aware of the courts' reluctance to interfere with a grand jury. The availability of
supervisory powers as an alternative ground for dismissal and the careful use of those
powers will impress upon prosecutors the need to adhere to procedural rules, but still
will permit courts to give deference to the grand jury institution. 149
Although in some cases a court may determine that a grand jury acted im-
145. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 785
(9th Cir. 1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 24-36.
146. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735-36 n.8 (1980); McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345
(1943); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979).
147. Few reported circuit court decisions have held that the defendant sufficiently demonstrated bias. In United
States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1974), the court reversed a conviction because the indictment had been issued as
a result of hearings in which perjured testimony had been presented to the grand jury. The court held that a prosecutor
must inform the grand jury of petjured testimony. One commentator explains this dearth of case law by asserting that
because many judges were once prosecutors themselves, it is difficult to convince "ajudge to consider seriously a motion
suggesting prosecutorial misconduct." Lawless & North, supra note 20, at 28.
148. Antell, supra note 26, at 156.
149. One commentator noted that supervisory powers possess "a significant potential for reconciling the conflicting
desires of the federal judiciary to improve standards for the protection of individual rights while exercising the self-
restraint appropriate to constitutional adjudication and to the delicate balances of the federal system." Note, The Supervis-
ory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1656, 1666 (1963).
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partially even though it was subjected to prosecutorial misconduct, the integrity of the
judicial system may be threatened by the prosecutorial misconduct that occurred.
Supervisory powers should be used to "guarantee that federal prosecutors act with
due regard for the integrity of the administration of justice. 50 Moreover, the pub-
lic's confidence in the judicial system is affected by the prosecutor's performance at
the grand jury stage. Courts appear to condone improper acts when the prosecutor is
allowed to prevail despite his or her misconduct. Rather, courts must "maintain
respect for [the] law [and] . . . promote confidence in the administration of jus-
tice." 151 The strong institutional interest in the maintenance of the appearance and
reality of fair practice by a grand jury is essential and cannot be compromised. 152
Numerous policy justifications have been presented to support the position that
an indictment should be dismissed only if prosecutorial misconduct has undermined
the ability of a grand jury to make an informed and objective decision. These jus-
tifications, however, do not outweigh the interests that are served by allowing courts
to exercise supervisory powers to dismiss indictments because of prosecutorial mis-
conduct.
Arguably, a court's use of supervisory powers would be inconsistent with the
nature of grand jury proceedings and with the role of the prosecutor in those pro-
ceedings. Grand jury proceedings give the jury broad investigatory powers, and,
therefore, the typical trial restraints on the type of evidence which can be considered
and on the scope of questions permitted are absent. 153 Broad investigatory powers are
necessary since the grand jury's ultimate goal is to determine whether probable cause
for trial exists. In the same respect, since a grand jury does not determine a de-
fendant's guilt or innocence, misconduct by a prosecutor during a grand jury proceed-
ing is not as menacing as if the misconduct occurred at trial. A trial provides safe-
guards to protect the rights of a defendant.' 54
Likewise, the prosecutor's role is to prosecute those who have allegedly com-
mitted crimes. When a prosecutor's conduct does not bias a grand jury, the role of the
prosecutor has not been improperly enlarged. The Constitution provides that an
impartial grand jury must determine if probable cause for trial exists. 155 Provided that
the grand jury was not biased by prosecutorial misconduct, the rights of the defendant
have been upheld, and no justifiable interest is served by dismissing the indictment. If
a grand jury has made an independent determination, the integrity of the judicial
system also has been maintained.
15 6
150. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 793 (9th Cir. 1974) (Hufstedler, J., concurring); see also United States
v. Gonsalves, 691 F.2d 1310, 1317 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); see also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
152. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979).
153. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
154. See United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982). In Costello
v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), for instance, Justice Black stressed in his majority opinion that upholding a
challenge to an indictment on the ground that the indictment is not supported by competent evidence would "add nothing
to the assurance of a fair trial." Id. at 364.
155. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19 (1960); United States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th
Cir. 1981).
156. United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982).
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This analysis, however, is incomplete. It can be very difficult to demonstrate
that a grand jury was biased by a prosecutor's misconduct. Moreover, this analysis
provides no relief for the negative personal and professional consequences that a
defendant will experience because he or she was improperly indicted. Nor does this
analysis account for the fact that prosecutorial misconduct often distorts the truth
thereby undermining the grand jury's ultimate goal of determining whether probable
cause for trial exists. Finally, this analysis fails to account for the need to deter
prosecutorial misconduct and the need to uphold the public's confidence in the
administration of justice. Prosecutorial misconduct threatens the integrity of the ju-
dicial system, regardless whether the misconduct did not improperly influence the
grand jury's determination.
Arguably, the independence of the grand jury system will be enhanced if courts
are denied the use of supervisory powers to dismiss indictments. The Ninth Circuit,
in United States v. Chanen, 157 stated that if courts were free to use their supervisory
powers to dismiss indictments, the use of these powers would undermine the separa-
tion of powers between the judicial and the executive branches of government. 158 The
court feared that the freedom to use supervisory powers would give judges too much
control and influence over the role of prosecutors in grand jury proceedings. In
addition, the trial judge who uses supervisory powers might usurp the role of the
grand jury, since a court might misuse its supervisory powers when it decides
whether a jury reasonably found probable cause in a particular case. A grand jury
should not be influenced by the judicial branch of government.15 9
These concerns and fears over the use of supervisory powers to dismiss in-
dictments are shortsighted for three reasons. First, the grand jury must be in-
dependent of the prosecutor as well as of the court. 160 The most effective way to
prevent potential abuse of the system and to ensure the independence of a grand jury
is to require strict adherence to established procedural rules. The mere existence of a
court's supervisory powers will encourage prosecutors to abide by these rules.
Second, to require prosecutors, through the use of supervisory powers, to adhere to
procedural rules is not an infringement of their independence since prosecutors are
not free to violate established procedure. Third, the existence of supervisory powers
will not infringe upon the independence of the grand jury or the independence of the
prosecutor. The availability of supervisory powers does not require that they be
exercised liberally. In fact, many courts that recognize the right to exercise supervis-
ory powers have declined to uphold the exercise of this right. 161 Courts must use
self-restraint by not dismissing indictments indiscriminately. A court that exercises
157. 549 F.2d 1306 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). The court in Chanen stressed, however, that "a
clear basis in fact or law" would support a court's invocation of supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment. Id. at 1313.
158. Id. at 1312. But see infra note 160.
159. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
160. Id. Appellate courts often have confused the status of the grand jury by classifying it as an agency of the court
or a prosecutorial arm of the executive branch. Under the constitutional scheme, however, the grand jury is not to be
"captive to any of the three branches." Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
161. See, e.g., United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1983); United States v. Thibadeau, 671 F.2d 75 (2d
Cir. 1982).
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its supervisory powers also should be required to articulate clearly the basis for
dismissal so that a reviewing court may control the potential abuse of supervisory
powers. A clear standard which establishes when a court should invoke its supervis-
ory powers to dismiss an indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct must be
articulated. The use of self-restraint, the existence of higher court review, and a
defined standard of application will ensure the independence of the grand jury and the
prosecutor.
Practical considerations may weigh against a court's exercise of supervisory
powers. 162 Participants in a trial will inevitably make mistakes, and, arguably, an
indictment should not be dismissed unless those mistakes affect the grand jury's
objective determination. Otherwise, if every error justified indictment dismissal,
grand jury proceedings would be sidetracked by insignificant technicalities. 163 Fur-
thermore, liberally applied sanctions might lead to the demise of the grand jury
system.' 6
4
The discriminate use of supervisory powers, however, will allow a court, before
it dismissed an indictment, to consider the expense and delay in the prosecution of
crimes and the egregiousness of the prosecutor's error, since errors are inevitable in
every proceeding. Moreover, the use of supervisory powers will strengthen rather
than undermine the grand jury process. The grand jury institution has been the subject
of severe scrutiny; many commentators believe that the grand jury process is in-
efficient and outdated. 165 Some commentators argue that the grand jury is ineffective
because it is subject to the will and control of the prosecutor, and thus, the grand jury
is the "rubber stamp" of the prosecutor.' 66 Accordingly, these commentators sug-
gest that the grand jury should be abolished. This "rubber stamp" criticism un-
derscores the necessity for a court to be granted supervisory powers and the necessity
for a court to exercise these powers to combat prosecutorial abuse. The use of
supervisory powers would be an effective way to enhance the image of the grand jury
as an independent and credible institution since a court would dismiss indictments
which resulted from hearings involving prosecutorial misconduct.
Some people may argue that the use of supervisory powers to dismiss grand jury
indictments violates public policy. The public has an important interest in the prose-
cution of crimes. 167 The judiciary also has an interest in bringing criminals to trial
without expensive delays. 168 In addition, criminal defendants should not receive a
benefit, the dismissal of charges against them, from prosecutors' mistakes unless the
162. See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 (1983).
163. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
164. Keeney & Walsh, The American Bar Association's Grand Jury Principles: A Critique from a Federal Criminal
Justice Perspective, 14 IDAHO L. REv. 545, 564 (1978).
165. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrAus, supra note 4, at 117-38; Antell, supra note 26; Morse, A Survey of the Grand
Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REv. 101 (1931); Whyte, Is the GrandJury Necessary? 45 VA. L. REv. 461,488-91 (1959); see
also Reform of the Grand Jury System: Hearings on S.3274 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40 (1976) (prepared statement of Hon. John K. Van de Kamp).
166. Antell, supra note 26, at 154; Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative Agency
of the Prosecutor, 2 N.M.L. REv. 141 (1972).
167. United States v. McKenzie, 678 F.2d 629, 631 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1982); United States v.
Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 200 (6th Cir. 1982).
168. West v. United States, 359 F.2d 50, 56 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 867 (1966).
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defendants' rights have been adversely affected; otherwise society would be punished
for the errors of a prosecutor. 169 However, the fear that guilty defendants will go free
is unwarranted. Double jeopardy does not apply to the grand jury; thus a prosecutor
may present the same case to a second grand jury if an indictment is not secured from
the first panel of jurors. 17 0
The deterrence of prosecutorial misconduct and the preservation of the
judiciary's integrity are separate and distinct goals from the protection of the de-
fendant's right to an independent and impartial grand jury;17 1 "the individual de-
fendant . . . serves only as a conduit for vindication of the public interest."1 72 These
interests in deterrence and integrity are also to be distinguished from and given
precedence over the interests in the mitigation of public expense and the ensurance
that crimes are prosecuted. The public's vitally important interest in the fair and
orderly administration of justice is primary. 173 A prosecutor must strictly observe the
procedural rules of grand jury proceedings. In addition, a prosecutor must be sub-
jected to disciplinary action for violations of those rules. 7 4 The public's interests are
best served by granting supervisory powers to courts so that they may dismiss in-
dictments when a prosecutor is guilty of misconduct which threatens judicial integrity
or which must be censured to deter future misconduct.
VIII. A STANDARD OF APPLICATION
A workable standard that explicitly identifies the circumstances in which prose-
cutorial misconduct warrants the dismissal of a grand jury indictment must be de-
veloped. A workable standard will facilitate the effective use of supervisory powers.
Courts which have held that supervisory powers may be exercised to dismiss an
indictment because of prosecutorial misconduct often do not articulate satisfactorily
the standard which should be applied to determine when dismissal is appropriate.
Most courts agree that supervisory powers should not be applied indiscriminately,1
7 5
but beyond this, courts neither consistently nor clearly define the standard that should
be applied in deciding whether an indictment should be dismissed. Some courts have
indicated that only willful or deliberate misconduct justifies the exercise of supervi-
169. United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 299 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1979).
170. M. FRANKEL & G. NAFrALIS, supra note 4, at 97. The decision to resubmit a case to a grand jury is a matter of
prosecutorial discretion that generally is not subject to judicial scrutiny. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124
(1979).
171. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 816-17 (3d Cir. 1979).
172. United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d 1386, 1395 (9th Cir. 1983) (Norris, J., dissenting in part),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984); see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 527 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
173. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 527 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
174. Freedman, Discipline An Errant Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1984, at AI5, col. 2.
175. See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 722 F.2d 1192, 1195 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 719 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1441 (1984); United States v. Pino, 708 F.2d 523,530 (10th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Pabian, 704 F.2d 1533, 1536 (1 1th Cir. 1983); United States v. Ogden, 703 F.2d 629, 636
(1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Artuso, 618 F.2d 192,
196-97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 861 (1980).
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sory powers to dismiss an indictment. 176 Other courts state that an indictment may be
dismissed only on the basis of longstanding prosecutorial misconduct. 1
A court should have the ability to dismiss an indictment even though a defendant
cannot prove that the prosecutor's misconduct biased the grand jury. A court's super-
visory powers, however, should not be applied indiscriminately since an in-
discriminate use of this power might undermine the grand jury's independence from
the judiciary and might impose insignificant technical rules if every mistake were to
warrant dismissal. Before a court dismisses an indictment on supervisory grounds, it
should consider the following questions.
First, was the jury unduly influenced by the prosecutor's misconduct? A court
should consider the type of misconduct, the amount and character of other evidence,
and the defense counsel's ability to obtain evidence that indicates how the jury
reached its decision.178 As the certainty that a reasonable jury would have reached the
same conclusions regardless of the prosecutor's misconduct decreases, the
appropriateness for a court to invoke its supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment
increases.
Second, will dismissing the indictment deter future misconduct by the offending
prosecutor? A court should consider past violations by the prosecutor. It also should
determine whether the mistake was a deliberate disregard for procedural rules, or
whether the prosecutor simply was careless or negligent. 179 The more flagrant and
deliberate the misconduct, the greater the need for dismissal of the indictment.' 80
Third, will dismissing the indictment deter other prosecutors from acting im-
properly? 18 1 Courts in a particular jurisdiction must address pervasive misconduct.
Therefore, the more common and widespread or longstanding the misconduct, the
greater the need to dismiss the indictment in order to deter prosecutorial mis-
conduct. 1
82
Fourth, can misconduct be deterred in a less drastic way than dismissal of an
indictment?' 83 If a possibility for the imposition of professional disciplinary action or
some other sanction exists, then the court may be less concerned with deterring the
misconduct by dismissing the indictment. 184
176. See, e.g., United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United
States v. Quiovers, 539 F.2d 744, 746 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Nembhard, 676 F.2d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d
807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Fields, 592 F.2d 638, 648 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
178. See United States v. Serobo, 604 F.2d 807, 818-19 (3d Cir. 1979).
179. Cf. United States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 944 (1978).
180. In United States v. Bush, 730 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1984), for instance, the court noted that "[ilf, following the
grant of a suppression motion, a federal prosecutor were to present the same evidence to a grand jury, the application
of... supervisory power[s] ... might well be appropriate." Id. at 130.
181. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974).
182. See United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979); United States v. Houghton, 554 F.2d 1219,
1224 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 851 (1977).
183. United States v. McClintock, 734 F.2d 438, 444 (9th Cir. 1984).
184. The Supreme Court held in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976), that prosecuting attorneys are immune
from tort liability under federal common law for actions taken in the scope of their duties. Courts, however, may sanction
prosecutors by citing them for contempt of court. United States v. Dozier, 672 F.2d 531, 545 (5th Cir. 1982) (In absence
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Finally, to what extent does a second presentation of the case before the grand
jury burden the judicial system?'" 5 The length of the original hearings should be
considered in order to determine whether the time and expense of calling a new grand
jury outweigh the possible deterrence value of dismissing the indictment. The effect
another hearing would have on the witnesses should also be determined.'1 6 The more
traumatic the experience for the witnesses, the less desirable it is to require the
witnesses to re-testify. Courts also should consider the practical problems of another
hearing, such as the unavailability of witnesses or the loss of evidence. The in-
dictment's effect on the defendant must also be assessed. The damage to the de-
fendant's reputation which results from an unfair grand jury proceeding should out-
weigh any administrative concerns in most circumstances.
All of these factors should be considered together, and no one factor should be
determinative. The interests involved must be balanced, and special attention must be
given to the notion that supervisory powers are to be used sparingly. A court should
state clearly the reasons which justify its election to exercise its supervisory powers.
An explicit opinion will allow reviewing courts to determine whether the trial court
abused judicial discretion and will warn prosecutors about the type of conduct which
warrants dismissal.
IX. CONCLUSION
Supervisory powers should be granted to courts so they may dismiss grand jury
indictments in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. The use of these powers will
enhance the protection of individual rights, deter future prosecutorial misconduct,
and preserve the integrity of the courts and the grand jury process. Moreover, the
availability of supervisory powers will promote confidence in the administration of
justice, yet will allow courts to exercise self-restraint in deference to the con-
stitutional requirements of due process. In addition, the use of supervisory powers
will not frustrate public interests as long as an appropriate standard to govern the
exercise of the powers is adopted.
The grand jury was designed to control abuses by the government and to protect
the interests of the accused. The conduct of the prosecutor must be restricted in a
manner consistent with these goals. At a time when the grand jury process is being
severely criticized, the image of the grand jury as an independent institution, free
from the control of the prosecutor, should be reinforced.
In order to deal effectively with prosecutorial misconduct and to increase public
confidence in the grand jury system, the grand jury process need not be altered.
Rather, a prosecutor must be required to adhere strictly to existing procedural rules.
Proper prosecutorial conduct will encourage community trust in the judicial system;
improper prosecutorial conduct will create community distrust and violate public
of prejudice to a defendant, a contempt citation, a less drastic remedy than indictment dismissal, must serve to deter
prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings.). Courts also may sanction prosecutors by identifying and chastising
them in judicial opinions. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1983).
185. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
186. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983).
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policy. The existence of supervisory powers will encourage prosecutors to adhere to
procedural rules, and the use of supervisory powers will operate as an effective check
on prosecutorial misconduct. Courts have a duty to maintain the integrity of the
judicial system. 187 Therefore, in accordance with a clearly defined standard, a court
should be permitted to invoke supervisory powers to dismiss an indictment when a
prosecutor has engaged in misconduct, even though the misconduct does not prej-
udice the grand jury's decision to issue an indictment.
Douglas P. Currier
187. One commentator alleges that "[vliolations of professional ethics by prosecutors are far too frequent," and that
"little is ever done to punish an offending prosecutor." Freedman, supra note 174.
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